Thursday, February 28, 2013

Readings (2)


The very first of the readings in Chapter 1, The Human Condition (p. 26), contains a stock passage that the Buddha employs again and again throughout the discourses to characterize those who attain awakening (bodhi) and release (mokkha)—including himself—as follows:

“…whose taints are destroyed, who have lived the holy life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached their own goal, utterly destroyed the fetters of existence, and are completely liberated through final knowledge.”

The process leading to release is described in terms of elimination of taints (asavā, variously translated as defilements, in- or outflows, corruptions), the perfection of a celibate and otherwise restrained way of life, the accomplishment of the required tasks, the attainment of benchmarks which trainees themselves set, and the overcoming of all attachments—in short, a sustained course of intentional acts performed with deliberation and full awareness, and leading in a series of stages to freedom from the cycle of birth-and-death, a condition that is achieved through and with knowledge. Cessation of renewed existence is the end.

In contrast, teachers in the lineage of Dōgen tend to discourage goal-orientation. Practice (if that is the right word for what we do) is sometimes characterized as open-ended or indeterminate. As students of Zen chant daily, “there is no attainment and nothing to attain.” Enlightenment in Zen is described in all-or-nothing terms, as innate and suddenly realized, or else embodied and lived in selfless obscurity. Because samsara and nirvana are not-two, there is no need for release. The cessation of suffering (nirvana) is indefinitely postponed for the sake of all sentient beings.

Looking at the two schemata side by side, it seems safe to say that Zen is not of the same species as its ancestor, Early Buddhism. Their disparate attitudes and doctrinal perspectives generated correspondingly different criteria for correct practice.

Monday, February 25, 2013

The Patriarch's New Robe


[At the request of a fellow student who wishes me to say more about the circumstances in which Chan was born, I move forward in time with dizzying speed, from the Buddha’s India to the epoch of the translations of Buddhist texts into Chinese. Although the key events of a millenium can barely be summarized in 5,000 words, perhaps the outline will be helpful.]

1
In the culture of Chan/Zen, no legend carries more weight than the story of the patriarchal succession, the transmission of the flame of transcendental wisdom from one enlightened master to the next. A lot depends upon the factuality of that ancestral line, not least the contemporary Zen Master’s direct link to the Dharma’s ancient source in the person of Shakyamuni himself. On the strength of that alleged connection, Zen masters ancient and modern have successfully claimed the inheritance of no less than the whole of the true and authentic Buddha-dharma. The matter of Zen’s actual history, as opposed to the stories Zen tells about itself, is of much more than academic interest for Western students of Zen in our own time. It is implicated in problems such as male domination and abuse of authority, as well as the paramount questions of the nature and function of The Transmission, an institution that has received far less discussion within the community of Zen practitioners than is warranted.

To make the kind of grandiose claims that Zen makes about itself takes a lot of chutzpa given early Chan’s relative lack of well-defined doctrinal and practical teachings that might give flesh and bone to the ineffable “sudden enlightenment beyond words and letters.” The assertion that a line of individuals owns Buddhahood is breathtaking when one considers that in the dark days before the Song dynasty (960-1279 CE) there was, so far as we know, scant evidence of Bodhidharma himself. The sole document attesting to his presence in China, The Record of the Buddhist Monasteries of Luoyang (547 CE), mentions a foreign-born visitor to Chang-An, then the capital, who greatly admired the temples he viewed there. During that same period there is no mention of a line from the Buddha to Bodhidharma; only the flimsiest of support for a link between Bodhidharma and the founding of Shaolin Monastery; and, apart from conflicting genealogies, no evidence connecting Bodhidharma to the various candidates for membership in the crucial line of early Chinese patriarchs. Yet out of such poor materials a few Tang dynasty biographers constructed an edifice of narrative strong enough, despite its stairways to nowhere and its blank corridors, to endure up to the present. How did they bring it off? They did it by skillful use of tropes drawn from Buddhist and Daoist tradition, plus prodigious quotation from the very sutra literature made redundant by the purported existence of the patriarchal line itself.[1] And somehow they convinced even their rivals to give tacit approval to the project.

Among scholars of Chan and the more thoughtful practitioners of Zen, the dubious ontological status of the patriarchal succession has been the elephant in the dojo for decades. A generation of academic writers that includes Bernard Faure and John McCrae has more than once tiptoed tantalizingly close to the flimsy screen behind which the inventors of Chan sat like so many Wizards of Oz, without ever directly challenging the veracity of the Chinese writers. By their respectful silence scholars of Buddhism have lent credence to the myth of an actual Chan lurking somewhere in the historical background of the texts—not the serene, gradually-attained dhyāna-samādhi of Indian Buddhism, but the sudden, wordless or slangy, in-your-face, Three Stooges kind. It fell to Alan Cole to perform the task of disrobing the patriarchs. He has done so with wit, courage and skillful erudition. The main thrust of his very entertaining book is to examine the biographical texts against the historical and literary background of Sui and Tang China in which the prototypical Chan Masters made their first appearance.

Every student of Zen knows that Bodhidharma, founder of the Chinese line, eschewed scholarship, assiduously avoided the limelight, lived in a cave and declined opportunities to improve his status, going so far as to speak disrespectfully to the Emperor. The best-known of the early Chan masters, the Sixth Patriarch, Huineng, is depicted a naïf, an illiterate bumpkin who took employment on the fringes of society in the manner of a Daoist sage. However, the extant literary evidence suggests that the early patriarchal succession as it has come down to us is the product of competing factions within the Tang monastic establishment. For the student of Zen, Alan Cole and others provide the scholarly data necessary to understand the process by which Shaolin Monastery, among others, strove to establish itself as the epicenter of Chinese Buddhism by embroidering upon a myth, namely, the Transmission of perfect Buddhahood, from mind to mind, down through the ages from Shakyamuni to your neighborhood Zen Master. While the story, with its backdrop of religious rivalries and dynastic warfare, is not devoid of romance, it fatally undermines the standard literary account in which Bodhidharma came from the West, faced the wall for nine years, took up residence at Shaolin Monastery and taught the monks kung-fu.

If I am reading the texts aright, the genealogists of the Tang knew that they were playing fast and loose with history. Moreover, they undoubtedly caught each other in any number of egregious falsehoods, yet refrained from pointing out each other’s transgressions. That failure forces upon us a fairly obvious point. If it is possible for us, who live at a great remove in space and time from the Tang Dynasty writers, to see through their tricks, how much easier must it have been for the Buddhist establishment of the day to detect the successive erasures and substitutions. Yet, no one came forward to blow the whistle or, if anyone did, his protests have been expunged from the record. On the contrary, competing monastic factions raced to add their own embellishments to the evolving narrative. It was as if, with the publication of the earliest living-buddha bios[2] and the entries for Bodhidharma and Huike in The Encyclopedia of Emminent Monks, lightbulbs had appeared above the heads of the most ambitions Buddhists in China. Here, at last, in the person of the fully enlightened man, was the basis for establishing a Buddhist Papacy and enthroning an infallible authority in the flesh. It hardly mattered whether or not the actual Bodhidharma had been a practitioner of meditation, had visited the vicinity of Shaolin Temple, met the Emperor or even existed. He was an idea whose time had come.

There was, in pre-Tang China, a pressing need for a Buddhist institution with sufficient authority to act as a counterweight to the power of the ever-contested imperial throne, and for a person of unquestionable religious authority—a powerful Other—who, from a position of relative equality and independence, could advocate for the economic and social interests of the monastic community. It is not hard to imagine how a central or at least prominent Buddhist agency, might be seen by the Emperor’s court as a step forward in bureaucratic efficiency. It had the additional advantage of serving as a source of legitimacy for new or unstable governments. The prospect of greater political clout and economic stability was a powerful reason for the Buddhist establishment to cooperate in a literary scam of this magnitude. Successive writers of bogus biographies had no motive to expose their immediate predecessors as long as there was a chance that their own lineages were still in the running. Each genealogist in turn merely altered the narrative and built upon it, revising the list of ancestors to bump a previous claimant and install his guy as the reigning Father. (The standard list of the first six patriarchs does not become a settled matter until the 8th century.) If the Buddhist monks of the Tang were not already primed by circumstance to seize upon and develop the notion of a living Buddha almost as soon as it appeared, we are at a loss to explain how those creative genealogists got away with the most stupendous fraud in the history of Chinese Buddhism.

2
Politics was not the only inducement to turn a blind eye to the dissembling of the genealogists. To get a more detailed picture of the cultural forces that worked to favor the adoption of Chan—a child of uncertain parentage who would normally be shunned by respectable people—we must look back to the formative period of the second through the fifth centuries C. E., during which the Buddhist scriptures made their way into China via Central Asia, in a trickle at first and then in a torrent. By the early fifth century, the Buddhist community was in possession of a great many important sutras and treatises, among them a redaction of the early Buddhist scriptures known in Sanskrit as Agamas. The definitive translations of the Mahayana sutras had been completed, and the schools of speculative Indian Buddhism, such as the Madhyamaka, Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha, were well represented. A scholarly monk of the period would have found himself cast adrift upon a dauntingly broad and disparate sea of texts, all of them assumed to be the teachings of the Buddha or derived from them with varying degrees of plausibility. If he were diligent, intelligent and sensitive to stylistic nuance, he would have noticed that the straightforward and pedestrian style of the Agamas was very different from the poetical and dramatic sophistication—not to mention the hyperbole, bombast and flagrant self-promotion—of the vaipulya (“expanded” or "extensive”) sutras. And if, as a number of important Mahayana scriptures state, the highest wisdom is too profound and subtle to be grasped by even the most accomplished of bodhisattvas, then the entry-level devotee might be forgiven for wondering of what use such teachings could be to her. More troubling, however, was the stressful if subtle dissonance amongst the doctrines propounded by representative texts of the Great Vehicle itself. We can get a feel for the situation by briefly examining a few such problem areas.

It is fair to say that, by the time Buddhism got a foothold in China, it had already undergone drastic changes. Early Buddhism is characterized by a clear goal, namely, the permanent cessation of discomfort by escape from the round of renewed existence; a single key concept, causal-conditionality; and a relatively straightforward course of moral, emotional and cognitive training aimed at bringing about liberation. In the hands of the Great Vehicle’s proponents, the Path vanishes into a vast, dark forest of literary devices, abstractions and metaphors. Free-standing texts promise the rewards formerly conferred by training. Faith and devotion, minor if necessary virtues in the early days, become paramount.

Let us begin our very brief tour of the Mahayana literature by noting its most conspicuous feature, namely, the absurdity and topsy-turvyness of the overall mindscape it establishes, in which the Path is turned around, so that the disciple begins at the end or discovers that the end is really the beginning and vice-versa, or that there is really no path at all because there is no attainment of enlightenment and nothing to be attained. In Mahayana World, practice has merged with awakening, difference is identity, effect collapses into cause or precedes it, and what was once attained gradually—or was it?—has become instantaneous. The stage is now set for the entrance of a discipline—or is it?—that institutionalizes paradox and outright nonsense. Everything you know is wrong. And that’s not all! It turns out that what Indians regarded as mainstream Buddhism for a millennium was not true Buddhism, or at least not the whole story. In fact, the Buddha was not really a human being. In any case he has (note the present tense) not one body but three. Or else everything is the body of the Buddha. Each person is responsible for her own actions, unless she chooses to make the Buddha responsible for them, as in the Pure Land teachings. And so on.

Chinese Buddhists of course did what bewildered folks of all religions do when confronted with difficulties of this kind. They sought a solution to the problem of scriptural inconsistency in the scriptures themselves. There were several reasons why that approach would come up short. The transition from early Buddhism to the Mahayana was not just a matter of superior doctrines and practices supplanting inferior ones. Nor was there a single agenda that unified the post-Agamic sutras that were brought together in the Chinese Buddhist canon. Its authors did not intend for the Mahayana literary corpus to turn out the way it did. Let us recall that, although “The Great Vehicle” is the rubric by which we now designate all texts that exhibit certain doctrinal or literary features, the individual sutras began their careers as unrelated documents that appeared higgledy-piggledy over several hundred years in various parts of India. We know little of the process by which the proponents of those diverse sutras gradually coalesced into a self-conscious movement. There is, however, ample internal evidence that the content of many of the Mahayana texts was intended to undermine and pre-empt the authority of those monks (and we must suppose that there were many) who persisted in regarding the new texts as forgeries and the proto-Mahayanists as parvenus if not heretics. According to the traditions of mainstream Buddhism, the Dharma of the Buddha is preserved by means of the speech and actions of the Sangha, who not only remember and recite the words of the Buddha but exemplify and realize the teachings in the course of their training. As against the orally transmitted discourses of the Agamas, the Mahayana vaipulya sutras are literary compositions whose authors attempt to relocate the authority of the Three Treasures to the texts themselves, thereby doing an end-run around their conservative monastic brethren. The supramundane, atemporal setting of the Mahayana sutras, replete with a universal Buddha, myriads of bodhisattvas and a host of celestial beings, made it easier for the authors to liberate religion from such worldly constraints as dependence upon tradition. Chinese intellectuals, steeped in reverence for the written word, were predisposed to co-operate in that literary transfer of wealth.

The Mahayana texts are not shy about revealing themselves to be the sole source of absolute truth and the proper focus of veneration, praise and meditation. All benefits come, not from the Buddha in his new role as a pitchman for the text, or from the Sangha, but from the sutra itself, which serves as a stand-in for the Dharma. Faith in the saving power of Mahayana texts is not to be confused with the reliance of early Buddhists on the word of the Buddha as it had been passed down by recitation. The expanded sutras of the Great Vehicle, although tricked out in the familiar conventions of the Buddha’s discourses (“Thus have I heard,” etc.), do not focus on clarifying the Buddha’s liberating vision and the methods by which it can be realized. Rather, in the manner of infomercials they announce themselves to be self-sufficient, free-standing entities and direct causes of Enlightenment. Having been given lives of their own, more than a few of the Mahayana sutras proclaim that this very book—not the Buddha or the Dharma or the Sangha—possesses powers of protection, healing and even salvation. The announcement by a character in a given text, that the text contains and embodies the highest truth, even when the exact nature of that truth is far from obvious, was sufficient to make it an effective talisman and object of worship. Had there been only one such sutra, the story of Mahayana World might have had a happy ending. But, confronted with a gaggle of texts all vying for one’s utmost devotion–“Read this sutra, recite this sutra, copy this sutra, bow to this sutra!”—how was a person to choose between so many final words? In the absence of a fully awakened being to adjudicate the sutras’ competing claims of religious ultimacy, interpret their extravagant language, and explain their abstruse concepts, Chinese Buddhism was a free-for-all of sutra cults and their associated philosophical schools. To refrain from relying upon words and letters in such circumstances is no more than prudent.

Let us make note here of a curious feature of time and history as described by the Mahayanists. According to the standard explanation for the relatively recent appearance of Mahayana literature, the most perfect teachings of the Buddha were hidden from the world for centuries because they could not be understood by the people of the Buddha’s day. Now they are revealed! But wait a minute. The theory of the Decline of the Dharma—a variant form of the Golden Age theme common to civilizations and widespread among Mahayanists—declares that the Buddha’s contemporaries were far more gifted in every way than the people of later epochs. Indeed, since the Buddha’s day there has been little else but decay. We will soon enter the Age of the Disappearance of the Dharma, the Buddhist Kali-yuga, if we are not already there. True, we are all originally or essentially Buddhas, for all the good it does us. Nevertheless, before we can attain nirvana—hold on a sec! We’re actually not going to do that—we are required to master the eight transcendental virtues and ascend through bodhisattva’s course of ten or more levels, depending upon who’s counting, and that could take innumerable kotis of kalpas. Yet those selfish Hinayanists only have to work their way through the four easy stages of arhatship. Now, tell me, brothers and sisters. Has enlightenment come closer or moved farther away?

Matters of such great import could not simply be left to sort themselves out. The task of Chinese Buddhist scholars was, therefore, to impose hierarchical order upon the mass of doctrines and texts. From the fifth century onwards systems of classification and ranking (panjiao) proliferate apace. But whose criteria would win the day? The Lotus Sutra declares itself to occupy the top position. Fans of the Avatamsaka would make a case that their favorite text is a record of what the Buddha taught immediately after awakening and is therefore foundational. The Pure Land school, which has an enormous following, insists that we ought to rely on the Buddha Amitabha to save us because to slog one’s way through countless lifetimes of spiritual practice is neither necessary nor even possible. Then there’s the Prajnaparamita-Madhyamaka faction avidly touting an anti-dualistic viewpoint that is no viewpoint and a practice that is no practice. You pays your money, you takes your choice.

The doctrine of skillful means (Skt. upāya) might seem at first glance to be a solution to the problem of accommodating novel and apparently incongruous ideas. (“Hey, it’s all good!”) The Lotus Sutra’s breezy, different-strokes-for-different-folks pragmatism is reassuringly tolerant and a good fit with the consumer orientation of the global marketplace in the 21st century. However, it turns out that there is a subtle downside to it. By seeming to license any and all expedients, the doctrine of skillful means devours its own significance. There is a real problem here for the average bodhisattva-wannabe. Short of realizing within myself the total knowledge of complete, unsurpassable awakening—and at just this point Bodhidharma enters stage West and commences to bat his eyelashes—how can I ever be sure that I’ve graduated from skillful enticements to the Real Thing? In upāya we have yet another backhanded repudiation of distinctively Buddhist dogma. With expediency elevated to a guiding principle, the boundaries of an already fuzzy and ever-shifting religious terrain become all but impossible to define, much less navigate. Buddha-Dharma expands to a point at which it ceases to be distinguishable from non-Buddhist teachings. The doctrine of Skillful Means also poses the danger that one might do nearly anything with minimal justification. Oops!

As if all that were not enough, Chinese pilgrims returned from India with the bad news that Mahayanists were not even close to the majority among the Buddhist monks, a fact that can hardly have encouraged confidence in the authenticity of the teachings. However, for the vast majority of Chinese Buddhists, with their deep attachment to books, it was already far too late to turn back. Therefore, from the sixth century onward, the intellectual energies of the monastic community were bent to the task of finding a way to overcome these difficulties. Two strategies proved to be the most fruitful.

The first was to devise a conceptual schema that reconciled, or at least concealed the differences between the various scriptural and scholastic traditions of Indian and Chinese Buddhism. That task was almost always accomplished by a combination of narrative—a story in which the Buddha taught the ultimate truth but, because no one could understand it, hid it away, to be found when people were ready for it (never mind that such a time had already come and gone)—and a system of ranking whereby every teaching, Buddhistic or not, has a place in a hierarchy of doctrine and can be taught when suited to the spiritual capacities of the intended audience. As we might expect, each school put its own favorite teaching at the top of the list. Despite the heroic efforts of Chinese Buddhist scholars, notably those of the Tientai lineage whose system of classification was widely adopted, they could not lay to rest or explain away the Mahayana’s numerous and bewildering inconsistencies. Many nagging questions remained. “Which teaching is the final teaching, or ultimate truth? How do we recognize it? Says who? And, seeing as we live a thousand years and half a world away from the source, how can we ever be sure we’ve got it right?”

The second strategy was to rewrite history and to finesse established doctrine in such a way as to guarantee the complete authority and unimpeachable authenticity of Chinese Buddhism in the person of the Great Lineage Master. Perhaps the earliest examples of this ploy are Guanding’s multiple literary re-creations of his teacher Zhiyi, the renowned abbot of Mt. Tientai. The best known example is that of Bodhidharma, who was portrayed as “pouring” his own complete enlightenment, in shaktipat-like direct transmission, into Huike and his many lines of Chinese successors.

3
The invention of the Chan patriarchy, and with it the legend of The Transmission, killed two birds with one stone. It was a way to save Chinese Buddhism in general, and the Great Vehicle in particular, from doubts and internal chaos. It accomplished that singular feat by means of a person, a savior who embodied the essence of Buddha-dharma. At the same time, it undercut the authority of scripture and once again made the Sangha the focus of veneration and merit, while conferring the lion’s share of religious power upon those monks who could convince others that they possessed the legacy of Bodhidharma and the all-encompassing authority that came with it.

As long as there was only one patriarch at any given moment, the succession could be strictly controlled and—in theory—the imperial throne could aggrandize and legitimize itself through a relationship with a single man, and vice-versa; hence, the efforts of the biographers to float the notion of a one-at-a-time patriarchy. In the event, the game of literary Capture the Flag was fiercely contested, and it soon became clear that no single community—not even so rich and well-connected a monastery as Shaolin—could maintain a monopoly on living buddhas. Patriarchs multiplied apace despite the best efforts of rivals to discredit them so that, after a century or so of literary skirmishing, several lines were sufficiently well-established to subdivide into sects and schools. (A similar sequence of events was to play itself out, with much the same result, when the tulku, or Incarnate Buddha appeared with the ascendancy of the Karmapa in 13th-century Tibet.) The tracking, fleshing out and rationalizing of the history and teachings of Chan and Zen would occupy scholars up to the present.

Let us stop briefly and pay our respects to the account given in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta (D.16), which on the face of it forecloses on the very possibility of a genuine esoteric Buddhism. According to that relatively early text, the Buddha declined to name a successor, insisted that he has withheld nothing, and urged his disciples merely to practice what he had already taught them. It is fairly obvious that contemporary students of Chan and Zen, in their zeal to appreciate and appropriate a uniquely Chinese cultural artifact, overlook a curious feature of zen “history.” The received version of events has the lineage of truth-holders begin with the Shakyan Buddha and flow unbroken from him to Mahākaśyapa and thence through 90 or so other people down to the present day. Yet nowhere in the very substantial trove of texts that made their way from India to China is there made mention of such a line. Even if we suppose that the Indian dhyana masters comprised an esoteric lineage with a very low profile, it is surely improbable that they would have left no literary or epigraphical traces whatsoever. In any case, once the line reached China, that shyness was soon abandoned. It is clear that the Chinese people who encountered the Dhyāna masters were unable to hold their tongues as well as the Indians before them had done, though it is a tad odd that they held off for several centuries before broadcasting the good news. A foreign monk named Bodhidharma is believed to have arrived in China in the early fifth century. He was not identified as the living link between the Buddha and the Chinese patriarchs until the late 7th century. If we are to believe the biographers, he and his successors did their best to avoid fame and fortune, a trait they shared—along with naturalness, spontaneity and a fondness for retirement—with their Daoist counterparts. And yet, by the Tang era, Bodhhidharma’s legacy was the happening thing, with monastic centers and teachers competing for ownership of the transmission, and a healthy if contrived rivalry between Northern and Southern, sudden and gradual, silent and noisy Chan.

4
As described by the inventors of Chan, the succession of Chinese Buddhas is an explicitly esoteric tradition, not dependent upon words and scriptures, leastwise not the words and scriptures of mainstream Buddhism. There are obvious advantages to that kind of religious status. The benefits of emerging into the light of history, after a long period of deliberate concealment, include unimpeachable authenticity, the power of exclusion, a monopoly on truth, and the cachet of belonging to the very best club. If you can make it fly, the esoteric vehicle delivers a very good return on a modest investment. The master of esoteric lore devalues exoteric religion with the aim of vesting himself with the sole authority over that very religion, while at the same time denying access to true knowledge except through initiation by himself and his “legitimate” successors. By repudiating dependence upon scripture, and asserting sole ownership of genuine gnosis/salvation, the esoteric community immunizes itself against accusations of heterodoxy based on standard interpretations of (because now superseded) formerly authoritative texts.

In the case of Chan, the whole of verbal, contemplative and liturgical Buddhist tradition is believed to be present—solely present—in the body of the master. Buddhist esotericism privatizes enlightenment and confers exclusive intellectual property rights upon lineage holders even as it promotes the view that everyone is fundamentally or originally awake. That one-to-one transfer of power has a curious consequence, to wit, it doesn’t matter in the least what the Zen Master says, because his inheritance, like that of his predecessor, had nothing to do with either practice or attainment, much less about listening to the Buddha’s words and training oneself in accord with them[3] Is it any wonder that the patriarchs uttered so much inspiring blather and so little in the way of practical advice? In this connection it bears mentioning that the creators of an esoteric “tradition” can say whatever they like about it without fear of contradiction. It is secret, after all. The only flaw in the plan is that anybody else can also make whatever statements they please regarding the form or content of the secret doctrine, simply by claiming membership in the club. Who can prove him a liar? That is just what happened in the case of Chan.

Before we take leave of the esoteric-exoteric dichotomy, let’s briefly review the complex relations between the Chan establishment’s perennial declaration of independence from words and letters, on the one hand, and its perennial reliance upon the scriptures of the Great Vehicle on the other. As noted, Zen, like all esoteric traditions, is protected by the breastplate of personal gnosis. You cannot debunk what you haven’t experienced—what, by definition, you can’t experience except by becoming part of the line, a process that necessarily entails casting aside any doubts you may have about the authenticity of the succession, among other things. Nevertheless, from the earliest days the proponents of Zen have employed selective quotations from Mahayana scriptures in support of their claims and as a kind of second-hand content. The main themes of the most frequently-quoted sutras and treatises would later become the doctrinal basis of Zen orthodoxy, and Zen the funhouse mirror-image of the Great Vehicle’s lofty and somewhat bewildering doctrines. Thus, the first thing to be noted is the dependence of Chan’s authors upon the very sutras whose authority they hoped to usurp by the novel stratagem of causing a Buddha to appear once again in the world.

Although Chan/Zen depended upon the Mahāyāna, it also rescued the Mahāyāna in the sense that devotees no longer needed to fret over inconsistencies of doctrine and practice, or concern themselves with questions of authority. The inventors of Chan gave Chinese Buddhists a living Buddha who could assuage doubts and provide interpretations of unimpeachable correctness, or at least the promise thereof, even as the wobbly, latter-day Buddhism was unified by the presence and charisma of the patriarch. Finally, Chan/Zen superseded Mahayana to the extent that the sutras and schools were made superfluous by the activities of the Buddhas right here in our midst. Or so the story was meant to go.

5
“But,” someone will say, “Surely all that has nothing to do with real Zen.” And there is a real Zen, by which I mean Zen culture, Zen practice, and Zen communities, a stunning fact that brings us up hard against the most extraordinary aspect of this altogether fascinating phenomenon. There can be no doubt that there were people practicing all sorts of contemplative exercises, aimed at both concentration and insight, from a very early period in China, and it is possible that Bodhidharma himself taught a kind of dhyāna-cultivation. However, in the early meditation texts that have come down to us there is nothing to suggest the range of bizarre interactions—gnomic utterances, shouts and blows—of the kind recounted in the great gongan collections of “classical” Chan. The rough-and-tumble of Dharma Combat still lay well in the future when the Shaolin stele was carved and legends of Bodhidharma composed. Nevertheless, if Chan was for decades a literary creation only, it soon became a religious, social, and cultural institution. Buddhist and Daoist contemplatives alike greeted the prospect of new  technology with enthusiasm. The creation and persistence of Zen myth and “history” was the catalyst for the transformation of Indian Buddhist self-cultivation into a uniquely Chinese contemplative spirituality that incorporated elements of Buddhist and Daoist praxis into a marvel of life imitating art.



[1] For the fascinating details of the process, I refer the reader to Alan Cole, Fathering Your Father: the Zen of Fabrication in Tang Buddhism, Berkeley, 2009, University of California Press. See also, Wendi Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission: On an Early Chan History, 2007, Columbia University Press. Works by Jeffrey L. Broughton (The Bodhidharma Anthology) and J. C. Cleary (Zen Dawn) also contain much about early Chan that is useful.
[2] Few Western students of Zen are familiar with Zhiyi, Xinxing and Faru, the sixth- & seventh-century prototypes for the Chan Master/Patriarch, the men whose biographers were the pioneers of both patriarchy and Zen. The main thrust of Cole’s narrative is to show how the familiar and widely accepted list of the first six Chinese patriarchs—Bodhidharma, Huike, etc.—is not the reflection of an historical reality but the trophy awarded to the victors in a series of hard-played games of combat genealogy and alternative history.
[3] Did the sixth Patriarch really need the Fifth in order to wake up? Read the Platform Sutra and decide for yourself! For more information about the origins and permutations of that important document, see “The History and Practice of Early Chan” in M. Schlutter and S. F. Teiser, eds., Readings in the Platform Sutra, 2012, Columbia University Press.

Friday, February 22, 2013

Buddhism Situated

We are studying the oldest surviving Buddhist scriptures. Although we cannot affirm that the texts truly contain “the Buddha’s words,” as the title of Bhikkhu Bodhi’s book might suggest, we can reasonably suppose them to take us as close to the utterances of the Awakened One and his immediate followers as we are likely to get. The records compiled by the early Buddhists encourage us to reflect on the literary sources of Zen in the light of the seminal ideas contained in the Nikāyas. They, and the related movements that follow, are an important substrate of the environment from which Zen draws nourishment.

India is the original milieu of Buddhism, which was born and flourished (not long after 500 BCE) in a rich medium of social, political and religious ferment. Amongst the many small states of the central and northern subcontinent, the relatively egalitarian, clan-based and republican forms of government were giving way to feudalism. The religion of the Vedas, after millennia of decline due neglect and encroachment by indigenous gods, was on the threshold of a vigorous revival. Intellectual life was dominated by the culture of the śramanas, a society of homeless truth-seekers whose views and lifeways embraced the mystical, the speculative, and the ascetical.

The Brhadaranyaka, Jaimini Upanisadbrahmana, and the Chandogya Upanisad had almost certainly been completed before the Buddha began to teach. Many of the ideas now associated with Vedanta were already in the air. The notion, that intentional actions shape the circumstances of future lives, was worked out collectively over generations by a community of wandering philosophers and yogins that included the Buddha, his older contemporary Mahavira, leader of the Jains, and may others whose names have not come down to us. During the same period, among both śramanas and devotees of the nascent neo-Vedic religion, the principle of harmlessness (ahimsa) was taking hold across a broad spectrum of movements.

In re-reading Bhikkhu Bodhi’s selections from the Pali canon I am once again awestruck by the brilliance and power of the Dhamma. The Awakened One drew heavily upon the common mythos of the period, and incorporated many elements bequeathed to him by his own teachers, Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta. Relatively little of what the Buddha taught was unique, and yet the man changed the course of Indian, South Asian and East Asian intellectual and spiritual life in ways that were truly revolutionary and astonishingly fruitful. How did he do it?  Shakyamuni’s great gift for managing both people and ideas, and his preference for practicality over speculation, were combined with an extraordinary keenness of observation and discernment. A few items stand out as especially noteworthy.
· The institution of the Sangha, organized around a rule that was flexible enough to accommodate all manner of women and men, enabled the Dhamma to be propagated far beyond the boundaries of its original habitat.
· Paticca-samuppāda (Skt. pratītya-samutpāda), is the Buddha’s vision of experience and the world as arising from causes and conditions, interdependently (literally, “coming-to-be-dependent-upon-arising together”). It is the key conception in terms of which other components of the Dhamma—such as emptiness and non-self—can be readily understood.
· The Buddha’s method of analyzing situations in terms of causes and conditions gave him the key to dissolving certain kinds of otherwise intractable philosophical problems.
· He was able to create a conceptual scaffolding on which he could hang a great many doctrines and practices, namely, the Four Realties and the Eightfold Path of the Noble Ones, which can be schematically shown as follows:
            1. The reality of dis-ease, unsatisfactoriness, or pain
            2. The reality of the cause of dis-ease
            3. The reality of the cessation of dis-ease
            4. The Path that leads to the cessation of disease, that is
                        i.    right view or understanding
                        ii.   right attitude, intention, or motivation
                        iii.  right speech
                        iv.   right action
                        v.    right livelihood
                        vi.   right effort or application
                        vii.  right mindfulness or recollection
                        viii. right mental/emotional equipoise
Theravada tradition refers to the eight factors collectively as the Threefold Training in Insight (i. and ii.), Conduct (iii., iv., and v.) and Samādhi (vi., vii., and viii.). Notice that the first factor of the Path, right understanding, comprises (among other things) the Four Realities, while the Fourth Reality consists in the Path. All of the many occasional teachings, which we encounter piecemeal in the collections, can be plugged into that framework.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Readings (1)


As I read through the preface, general introduction and first chapter of Bhikkhu Bodhi’s anthology of selections from the Pali, In the Buddha’s Words, I made note of the words, phrases, and passages that struck me as of particular interest to students of Zen. I will comment on them as time permits.

At p. 1, ¶2: Bodhi calls our attention to the fact that the purpose of the Dhamma was not to provide a comprehensive view of the world. The Buddha himself said that he was not a builder of systems, but an analyzer. Nevertheless, there was a clear aim to his teaching, which Bodhi identifies as “practical training, self-transformation, the realization of truth, and unshakable liberation of the mind.” As we shall see when we begin to examine the teaching and practice of Zen in more detail, those benchmarks are not always and everywhere applicable. Indeed, we are sometimes actively discouraged from looking at our practice in that way.

On p.2 Bodhi outlines the way he has organized the material, according to “the types of benefits to which the practice leads: (1) welfare and happiness visible in this present life, (2) welfare and happiness pertaining to future lives, and (3) the ultimate good, Nibbāna (skt., nirvāna).” The prospect of nirvana derives most of its limited appeal from the belief that unless ignorance and craving are extinguished, and the constituents of existence abandoned, one will endure an eternity of suffering. There are compelling reasons to consider that formulation problematical, mainly on account of the shakiness of the conceptual schema that includes action and its results (kamma-vipāka), renewed becoming (a. k. a., “rebirth,” punabbhava), and wandering in the realms of existence (samsāra). For now, suffice it to say that a growing number of Western Buddhists are inclined to focus on the first of the three benefits.

On p. 3 we find a discussion of the openness of the Buddha’s teaching, a matter which, as already noted here, seems to foreclose on the possibility of a leadership lineage such as the one first evoked by Chinese monks in the eighth century. In the same paragraph the process of testing the teaching is described as a “step-by-step procedure” and again, on the following page, as a “graduated path,” phrases that we should bear in mind as we proceed. The Buddha-Dhamma, which is “lovely in its beginning, lovely in its middle, and lovely in its ending,”(D.II, Mahalisutta) has the structure of a well-made path with plentiful guideposts and a destination that is forcefully proclaimed even though no one has come back from it to describe it. I briefly entertained the notion that nirvāna, like art (and Zen?), is hard to define yet recognizable when seen, but that thesis cannot withstand scrutiny. When the several Buddhist traditions are taken into account, we are faced with more than one conception of just what awakening (bodhi) and liberation (mokkha) are.

                                    (To Be Continued)

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Unavoidable Comparisons


Although it is probably correct to assume that the world is innately varied, the world as we know it is made of differences and distinctions. Among the many useful activities performed by our very complex nervous system are the analysis and synthesis of sensory data (including conceptions), the recognition of patterns, and the comparison of those patterns with others stored in memory. Such processes, together with others more obscure, enable us to make predictions about what might occur in future, and to adjust both our expectations and our behavior when things don’t go as we thought they would. Comparison is fundamental to our ability to solve problems and adapt to novel opportunities. It is one of the things we do best. It is also a habit and, therefore, a potential source of difficulties.

When students of Zen read the Pali texts, we are bound to notice that certain features of doctrine and practice differ from those espoused by the Zen Ancestors and by our own teachers. The discrepancies will strike us as odd because we are not just students of Zen but Zen Buddhists, after all. Enter the words “Zen” and “Buddhism” into a search engine and you will bring up a list of items numbering in the millions. What could be more natural than the linking of the two terms? And yet, as we proceed with our studies, we may experience a growing sense of tension between the two clusters of ideas. Uncovering the sources of that cognitive dissonance is one of the great benefits of comparative studies.

Followers of the Theravada call themselves Buddhists, as do Mahāyanists and devotees of Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna, despite marked differences in doctrine and practice. Are they justified in doing so? I am old enough to remember the early days of Buddhist ecumenism, when South Asian monastic elders sat at long tables with their Mahāyāna counterparts, uttering the platitudes of unity and cooperation, only to mock and denounce in private the heretical views and apocryphal scriptures of their “co-religionists,” while Chinese abbots were heard to impugn the decadence and moral turpitude of the tantric practitioners, influenced no doubt by residual antipathy to the Ching (Mongol) Dynasty. Attitudes have changed. There is nowadays not only a good deal more genuine tolerance, but a growing willingness to learn from each other. As a result, it is no longer necessary to devote quite so much energy to ignoring the obvious differences between the three main Buddhistic traditions.

In the past those discrepancies have been managed, or papered over, by means of theories that can be briefly summarized as follows:
· The principal innovations in doctrine and practice became necessary on account of a gradual deviation from the Dharma. They are the product of reform movements aimed at restoring Buddhism to its original purity.
· Novelties in theory and practice result from changing methods and standards of interpretation, or what theologians call hermeneutical strategies. These in turn depend upon speculations about what the Buddha really meant when he said, “X,” or what the words of the text imply.
·The successive revisions of Buddhism are in fact improvements, in the manner of free software upgrades. Thus, the Deer Park discourse can be thought of as the Beta version and the Three Turnings of the Wheel as Buddhism 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0.
· A closely related rationale is that of Skillful Means (upāya), according to which the Buddha taught a great many diverse things (sometimes simultaneously!), all of them appropriate to the needs and capacities of his listeners. The computer-literate can think of these as programs designed to run on the Śrāvaka, Pp/Madhamika, Yogacara and Tathāgatagarbha platforms respectively.
· Finally, there are tales according to which certain early texts (recall that the Buddha’s words were not written down) were hidden for the purpose of being retrieved later, when a more intelligent and spiritually evolved audience could fully appreciate their deep meaning (recall that, according to the doctrine of the decline of the Dharma, people’s faculties only deteriorated from the Buddha’s time onward).

The common element in most attempts to reconcile the inconsistencies in Buddhist teaching and practice is the assumption that the Nikāyas, the Prajnāpāramita literature, the Extensive (vaipulya) Discourses, and the philosophical treatises are various expressions of what is essentially one thing. The limitations of such a view should be obvious. It is a bed of Procrustes, requiring a constant labor of excision, whereas we should be striving to be inclusive. “Original” and “pure” are words beloved of fundamentalists and zealots. It is our obligation as scholars to examine the details of each Buddhistic teaching for what it is on its own terms, and evaluate each on its own merits, as a unique cultural artifact perfectly expressive of its time, place and culture.

We are less likely to be broken between the Scylla of ideology and the Charybdis of fact if we treat the main Buddhistic religions as we do the Abrahamic, that is, as a group whose members share varying amounts of genetic material, and therefore bear more or less of a family resemblance to one another. In the case of Judaism and Christianity, the latter is identifiable as a descendant of the former, but no one would mistake the one for the other. The same kind of genetic relations hold for Early Buddhism, the Great Vehicle so-called, and the Mahāyāna’s esoteric offspring, Mantrayāna and Zen.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Zen & Early Buddhism


This week we begin our study of passages selected from the Pali canon. The collections known as the Nikāyas, together with the Ahan Jing (Āgamas) of the Chinese Tripitaka, comprise the earliest stratum of the words and letters against which Zen declares its independence in a notorious saying attributed to Bodhidharma.

“A special transmission outside the scriptures;
No dependence on words and letters;
Direct pointing to a person’s mind;
Seeing into one's nature and attaining Buddhahood.

The suttas of the Pali Canon are not scriptures at all, in the sense of literary compositions, but orally transmitted synopses of what several generations of the Buddha’s successors understood to be the teaching of their tradition’s founder. In their distinguishable strata of antiquity and variable terminology, the sutta collections represent an evolving interpretation of the Dhamma, a work-in-progress that was frozen in time when the formerly recited words were written down three (?) centuries after the Buddha’s death.

It is doubtful that Zen’s “special transmission” refers to an alternate oral tradition alone. The earliest Chan genealogies suggest something more mysterious and akin to shaktipat, whereby the contents of enlightenment, whatever they may be, are poured from one vessel into another “directly,” or passed like a flame from one lamp to another. Anyhow, it is a matter of some interest to students of Zen that the special transmission is nowhere mentioned in the Pali Tipitaka; that, on the contrary, the Buddha is depicted as stating his intention to make the whole of his Dhamma—“which shines when taught openly”—freely available to everyone; and that, on his deathbed, the Blessed One refused to name a successor on the grounds that his disciples already knew perfectly well what to do.

The translators of the Āgamas from various languages into Chinese did not fail to notice the differences of content, tone and style between the collection of early discourses and the much more voluminous, poetical and doctrinally diverse scriptures of the Mahāyāna. In the fifth and sixth centuries of the Common Era, those discrepancies provoked a flurry of attempts to systematically categorize and evaluate the scriptures (panjiao), and eventuated in the crisis that would give rise to the Chan movement in the period of the Sui-Tang transition.