“The
Bodhisattva, Lord Avalokita, was faring deeply in the prajñāpāramitā when he realized that the five constituents of
experience are empty, and thus freed himself from all pain.” --Prajñāpāramitāhrdāyasutra
In the reading I.2(2), entitled
“The Anxiety Due to Change,” we are told that whereas the uninstructed
worldling projects the notion of a self on to the five khandha, or assimilates
the five khadha to the sense-of-self, the noble disciple does not identify with
the five khandha. He “does not regard form as self, or self as form…he does not
regard feeling as self, or self as feeling…he does not regard perception as
self…volitional formations as self…consciousness as self, or self as possessing
consciousness. That consciousness of his [!] changes and alters, etc.”
Just as in the opening lines
of the Heart Sutra, here we have the
key doctrine of non-self expressed in terms of the selflessness of the five
existential categories. Let’s review the terminology briefly.
Khandhā are
piles or heaps, categories into which the events that constitute our lives can
be sorted. Together they comprise the raw materials out of which we construct
the illusion of immutable selves, experience, mind, and consciousness. Note the
Buddha’s characteristic analytical method.
“I
am not a generalizer. I am an analyzer (“divider,” vibhajjavādi).” M. 2. 197 Subhasutta
At the same time the Buddha
does not wish us to suppose that the five heaps are anything like elements or
atoms, ultimate constituents of the world. The heaps are themselves contingent,
arising and changing in accord with causes and conditions. The word most often
found in association with “khandha”
is “upādāna,” which is usually
translated as “clinging.” “Entangled” or “involved” would serve as well or
better. The phrase, “upādānakkhandhā”
can be understood in more than one way. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation,
“aggregates subject to clinging,” is clearly intended to suggest that everything
we crave for and cling to belongs, ultimately, to one of these five categories
of things and events. They are therefore the basis of suffering.
But let us not overlook
another, more subtle meaning that the Buddha was at some pains to point out,
namely , that the heaps are mutually
clinging; that is, they are entangled with each other inseparably, they occur together,
and support both each other and the illusion of a permanent and immutable self.
The Mahāvedallasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya contains a passage in
which the Awakened One asserts the inseparability of consciousness, ideation
and feeling, and associates them both with wisdom (paññā)!
“That
which is called wisdom, venerable one, and that which is discriminating
awareness (viññāna)…and that which is
feeling (vedanā)…and that which is ideation (saññā), are these states associated or
disassociated? And is it possible to lay down a difference between them, having
analyzed them again and again? That which is distinguishing awareness and that
which is feeling and that which is ideation—these states are associated, and
not dissociated, and it is not possible to lay down a distinction between them,
having analyzed them again and again. Venerable one, whatever one feels, one
perceives; whatever one perceives, that one discriminates; therefore these
states are associated, not dissociated, etc.”
--M.43
It is not that an autonomous
Person erroneously identifies with one or another of the khandas, or that a
unitary Self mistakes the khandas for phases or attributes of itself, or that
an independent Agent arrogates the khandhas to itself, or anything like that. For
starters, the ordinary person has no idea of the khandhas. The main defect of
all such explanations is that they begin by positing the very entity the
existence of which the Buddha sought to refute. The Buddha’s conception of the
matter is very much more radical and a good deal more interesting. What’s
happening, the Buddha tells us, is that the interaction and co-operation of the
khandas produce, all together, the closely linked illusions of Self, World, Mind,
Experience and Consciousness. In other words, the five kinds of process are
themselves, at one and the same time, the illusion of self/world and the
conventional self who is “experiencing” the illusion.
The notion that a contingent
sense-of-self can be derived from multiple contributors accords remarkably well
with the pictures of consciousness and selfhood that are emerging from the
increasingly collaborative disciplines of cognitive psychology, neuroscience
and philosophy. According to the new consensus, the person is a complex and
intermittent agglomeration of functions and faculties that emerges from massive
parallel processing within cooperating areas of the brain stem, midbrain and
neocortex.
The khandha is one of the
most fundamental and versatile concepts in the Buddha’s world view. (The six
senses, objects, and sense-fields are perhaps its only serious competition.) It
is also accords astonishingly well with what the biological sciences are
telling us about the way human beings come to see themselves and others as
persons It behooves us to become intimate with this cluster of concepts because
· It is an instrument
that can be used to refute the idea, and overthrow the illusion of a permanent,
unchanging Self, together with the closely related illusions of constant
awareness, personal experience, and an enduring, self-existent mind. (Mind,
consciousness, experience, and self are useful conventions that we cannot do
without. It is only our mistaken notions of them that we need to dismantle and
throw out. The Buddha did not abolish the use of the personal pronoun.)
· It is the key to
understanding the mechanism of the arising of dukkha. "The Noble Truth of Suffering is this, monks: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering, association with what is unpleasant is suffering, separation form what is pleasant is suffering; in short, the five clinging heaps are suffering." --Dhammacakkapavatanasutta, S.56.11
· The same conceptual
schema serves to explain how the self-illusion works. It’s the answer to the
question, “If there is really no permanent, independent 'I,' then how do you
account for the persistence and strength of a sense-of-identity?” or “Why does
the existence of an immutable core of me seem to be self-evident to so many
people?”
A quick review of the five
khandha should be sufficient to establish the basis of the Buddha’s answer to
such questions as these. Our understanding turns on adopting his vision of
events as arising and ceasing contingently as part of a universal process.
First, a note on personhood
as the Buddha conceived of it. The person, or “being” has two primary aspects.
One is form (rūpa) and the other
is name (nāma).
“What
is name-and-form? Feeling, ideation, volitions, sensory stimuli and attention,
those constitute Name. The five elements and the form derived from them are
Form.” –S.2.3
Rūpa is
not merely the physical body, or matter as such, but the body as it appears,
having a particular, recognizable form and therefore capable of being given a
name. When we have taken sufficient notice of a body’s form that it becomes
useful and desirable to call it by name, it is no longer just a body. One has
by that point become aware to some extent of how that form manifests its inner
life. It has a special way of conducting itself, a certain range of passions, a
style of communicating. In short, it has character.
Rūpa,
“form” as one of the five constituent groups, refers first and foremost to
bodily form. It is what others see when they look at us and what we see when we
look at, say, photographs of ourselves. Although our bodies change in countless
ways over the course of a lifetime, in the short term they maintain a
relatively stable appearance such that, barring horrific mishaps, when I look
in the mirror in the morning, the form I see is very similar to the one I saw
yesterday. It is not hard for me to paste in a certificate of continuity and
declare it to be, in fact, my image. Another consequence of having a fairly
stable human form is that I have at all times a sensory perspective that is
unique. We will see the importance of perspective as we proceed.
Vedanā, “feeling.”
This term refers to the hedonic tone of what we call sensory experience. Do I
perceive this feeling to be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral? Whatever the case,
it is unusual for my present hedonic judgments to be markedly different from past
feelings. If I found the taste of chocolate ice cream to be pleasant over the
course of my life, I am likely to find it pleasant today and, if I don’t, it
may well be a sign that something is wrong with my body. We are able to make
such measurements because of the complex of faculties that are found in the
next several categories,
Saññā, “ideation.”
This group includes all mental functions that involve memory and
pattern-recognition. Association, comparison, concept-formation, analytical and
synthetic operations, imagination, logic and language all fall under this
rubric. (Recent findings of neuroscience suggest that this category corresponds
to a baker’s dozen of crucial neural networks and processing areas of the brain
stem, midbrain and cortices.) Each of our self-images is assembled out of
fragments of a particular history. Each of us develops cognitive habits that
distinguish this mind from all others. Not only do our individual perceptual
landscapes become the familiar ground of thought, the many faculties and
functions of our minds enable us to revise and augment our personal narratives
as needed, to create and re-create our self images in accord with our desires
of the moment as well as the exigencies of long-term survival. In the process
of self-maintenance, we arrange the elements of the story with an eye to what
serves our various, not always perfectly compatible interests and agendas, and
the result is not always complete consistency. Have you ever told a story about
your past only to learn that events could not have occurred the way you
remember it? That disparity is one result of our amazingly complex
data-processing ability. Another is the relatively narrow extent and range of
awareness, as determined by the prime directive of consciousness, to wit, the
need to eliminate redundancy.
Sankhāra,
“impulses.” (san + kr, that which accompanies performance),
i. e., motivating factors. In this category we find urges, wishes,
dispositions, drives, preferences, moods, etc. Again, we become accustomed to
observable patterns of motivation. When we find ourselves experiencing a novel
desire or aversion, or an inner conflict, we are likely to react by dismissing
such events as anomalies. “That’s not like me.” Such reactions testify to the strength of the illusion of a unified person. In fact the many impulses that arise in the course of a day are each the product of diverse causes and condition occurring over wide range of mental processes (neural networks) in response to an enormous number of sensory stimuli.
Viññāna, “sense-specific
awareness." Sensation comes in six kinds, namely, visual, auditory, olfactory,
gustatory, bodily sensations, and the other stuff—the sensations that can’t
conveniently be allocated to one of the five bodily senses—that we throw together
under the rubric of “mind.” For the Buddha, “consciousness,” as this term is
sometimes translated, is always sense-specific. It also conforms to
perspective. That is, when we are sitting across a table from one another, I
see you and you see me. Such experiences, repeated over months and years,
result in the expectation of a comfortably predictable pattern of events. Taken
together, and operating in concert, the khandha produce a compelling illusion
of permanence, continuity, immutability and agency.
The fact remains, however,
that consciousness is intermittent, incomplete, subject to decay, and the
product of complex events outside of our awareness. The events of our lives are
impersonal, contingent phenomena over which we have only limited and sporadic
control. The Buddha’s point in introducing us to the five categories is to
reveal the true nature of life as summarized in the Three Marks of Existence.
“All
impulses (or motives) are impermanent,
All
impulses are pain;
All
phenomena are without self.”